THE ILLUSION OF A FUTURE: A FRIENDLY DISAGREEMENT WITH PROF. SIGMUND FREUD

OSKAR PFISTER

EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE, BY PAUL ROAZEN, TORONTO, ONTARIO

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Oskar Pfister (1873-1956) was a pastor in Zurich (Zulliger, 1966) when in 1928, while practising as an analyst, he published a respectful reply to Freud's *The Future of an Illusion* (Freud, 1927). According to one of the letters from Freud to Pfister that have so far appeared in print, Freud's *The Future of an Illusion* 'had a great deal to do with' Pfister. Freud also said that he 'had been wanting to write it for a long time, and postponed it out of regard for' Pfister (Freud, 1963, p. 109). Assuming that it remains true in all questions of intellectual history that in order to understand a text we must appreciate the opponents that a thinker had in mind, then to appreciate the context of Freud's argument in *The Future of an Illusion* we have to know more about Pfister's own position, against which Freud said he was reacting.

Pfister's reply to Freud has until now not appeared in English. This has to be striking, since so much attention in recent years has been devoted to the problem of psychoanalysis and religion, and to the issue of the ways in which Freud might have been unduly biased against religions convictions (Erikson, 1969; Fromm, 1950; Meissner, 1984). Pfister's 'The Illusion of a Future' appeared in Freud's journal *Imago*, and is a sign of Freud's willingness to tolerate disagreement within his movement.

Freud did not always stick to his thesis as eventually expressed in *The Future of an Illusion*. In his case history of the 'Wolf-Man', for example, Freud (1918) had sounded quite differently disposed:

Apart from these pathological phenomena, it may be said that in the present case religion achieved all the aims for the sake of which it is included in the education of the individual. It put a restraint on his sexual impulses by affording them a sublimation and a safe mooring; it lowered the importance of his family relationships and, thus, protected him from the threat of isolation by giving him access to the great community of mankind. The untamed and fear-ridden child became social, well-behaved, and amenable to education.

So, in a clinical context, Freud could be far more religiously receptive than the clear-cut line of argument in *The Future of an Illusion* may make him sound. However complicated Freud's outlook on religion should be taken to be, the particular stand he took in *The Future of an Illusion* is consistent with an important strand in his outlook as a whole. In Freud's 1927 critique of religion he was countering not only what he thought of as Pfister's position, but he was also continuing to settle the differences between himself and the line of thinking which Jung had represented within psychoanalysis since before World War I.

When the full difficulties between Freud and Jung broke out (Roazen, 1975), Pfister had been exceptional among the Swiss in sticking by Freud's side. There are still so many letters to come out between Freud and Pfister that it cannot be safe to make any secure gen-
eralisations about their relationship. We do know that in 1919 Pfister helped found a new Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis; and then in 1928, when Dr Emil Oberholzer set up a separate Swiss Medical Society for Psychoanalysis, Pfister continued to be a leader in the Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis, which retained the only Swiss link with the International Psychoanalytic Association. Oberholzer’s group, evidently founded in opposition to Freud’s position on lay analysis, did not survive World War II.

Pfister’s personal and organisational loyalty to Freud only serves to make more apparent the seriousness of his differences with Freud as expressed in ‘The Illusion of a Future’. For Pfister was not just a man of God who felt compelled to speak out against atheism. Pfister’s thesis on religion is closely intertwined with his views on both morality and art. These subjects have in recent years given rise to a good deal of psychoanalytic re-examination. We know now, for example, that although in his later years Freud made a display of his distance from formal philosophy (Roazen, 1968), as a young man he was far more involved with it than we had ever realised before (Freud, 1990). So that when Pfister finds analogies between Freud’s position in *The Future of an Illusion* and the reasoning of Ludwig Feuerbach, it is striking how Freud’s own early reading of Feuerbach lay behind his ultimate thinking.

Freud’s approach to religion has to be a central part of understanding his work. For he went after not just the kind of position that Pfister stood for, but was also aligning himself alongside Nietzsche (Roazen, 1991) in attempting to overturn many aspects of traditional Western ethics. In *The Future of an Illusion* Freud was speaking as a sustained rationalist who believed in the overwhelming merits of science and progress. Pfister’s 1928 reply is bound now to seem almost prophetically telling. For Pfister was articulating some of the central inadequacies in Freud’s whole approach to ethics, art, and philosophy as well as, implicitly, the practice of psychotherapy. The belated appearance in English of Pfister’s ‘The Illusion of a Future’ should help foster further healthy debate within psychoanalysis.

**REFERENCES**


Dear Professor:
You have told me, in the kindly manner to which I've grown accustomed in nineteen years of working together, of your wish that I make public my objections to your pamphlet, *Future of an Illusion* and, with a generosity that is intrinsic to your mode of thinking, placed at my disposal for this purpose one of the journals you publish. You have my hearty thanks for this new proof of your friendship, which hardly surprised me. From the very beginning, you have made no secret, before me and the world, of your definite lack of belief; therefore, your current prophecy of a future without religion reveals nothing new to me. And you will smile when I find in the psychoanalytic method you have created a splendid means of clarifying and furthering religion, as you yourself did at the time of the famine, as we stamped about during a snowstorm on Beethoven's paths on the hills of Vienna and, as in earlier years, were not able once again to convince each other on this point, however willing I otherwise was to sit at your feet, overwhelmed by the riches and blessings of your intellectual gifts.

Your book was for you an inner necessity, an act of honesty and of a confessional mood. Your colossal life's work would have been impossible without the smashing of false gods, whether they stood in universities or church halls. Everyone who has had the pleasure of being closely involved with you knows that you yourself serve science with an awe and fervour that elevate your workroom to a temple. To be frank about it: I have a strong suspicion that you do battle against religion—out of religious feeling. Schiller holds out a brotherly hand for you to shake. Will you refuse it?

And from the standpoint of faith I see, more than ever, no reason to join in the clamour of individual zealots. Whoever has fought with such immense achievements for the truth as you and argued so bravely for the salvation of love, he especially, whether he wants it talked about or not, is a true servant of God according to Protestant standards. And he who through the creation of psychoanalysis has provided the instrument which freed suffering souls from their chains and opened the gates of their prisons, so that they could hasten into the sunny land of a life-giving faith, is not far from the kingdom of God. Jesus tells a subtle parable of two sons, one of whom obediently promised to go to his father's vineyard, without keeping his word, whereas the other stubbornly rejected his father's demand, yet still carried out the commandment (Matthew 21: 28ff.). You know how much the founder of the Christian religion favoured the latter. Will you be angry with me if I see you, who have intercepted such glorious rays of the eternal light and exhausted yourself in the struggle for truth and human love, as closer, figuratively, to the throne of God, despite your alleged lack of belief, than many a churchman, mumbling prayers and carrying out ceremonies, but whose heart has never burned with knowledge and good will? And because for the Christian who is oriented toward the Gospel everything depends on doing the divine will and not on saying 'Lord! Lord!'—do you understand that even I might envy you?

And yet I turn decisively against your judgement of religion. I do it with the modesty appropriate to an inferior, but also with the joyfulness with which one defends a holy and loved object and with a serious approach to truth that your strict school has encouraged. Yet I also do it in the hope that many a person who is frightened away from psychoanalysis by your rejection of religious belief will then take kindly to it again as a method and a sum of empirical insights.

And thus I do not wish to write against you, but rather for you, for whoever enters the lists for psychoanalysis, fights for you. But I too fight on your side, for nothing else is closer to your heart, as to mine, as the overcoming of illusion through truth. Whether you with your *Future of an Illusion*, or I with my 'Illusion of a Future' comes closer to the ideal, a higher tribunal will decide. Neither of us puts on the prophet's cloak, but instead is satisfied with the modest role of a meteorologist; yet meteorologists can also err.

Cordially,

Your

Oskar Pfister
FREUD’S CRITICISM OF RELIGION

(1) The Accusations

Freud posits religion as an illusion in his booklet *The Future of an Illusion*. Yet he defines the concept ‘illusion’ in a different way than is usually done. Ordinarily, it includes elements of deception and lack of validity. But Freud emphasises that ‘An illusion is not the same thing as an error’ (p. 30); ‘we call a belief an illusion when a wish-fulfilment is a prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations to reality, just as the illusion itself sets no store by verification’ (p. 31). In another context Freud refuses to take a position in his discussion of the truth-value of religious doctrine (p. 33).

Accordingly, one might face the possibility that religion is still granted validity. Freud’s example of Columbus’s illusion that he had found a new sea-route to India (p. 30) makes that clear. For the discoverer of America did not in fact reach India, yet others did so on routes opened by him. The Genoan also reminds us that much excellent realistic thought can be invested in an illusion. Without his having observed the curved surface of the sea and deduced the spherical form of the earth from it, the bold journey to the West would never have been undertaken. Here I am already drawing attention to the intimate merger of wishful and practical thought and I anticipate the question of whether in religion, as in a very large part of science generally, there can be a clean separation; or whether in both areas practical thought doesn’t try in vain, within a broad scope, to lay bare the pure objectivity beyond wishes or their results. But stop! I don’t want to give too much away or let myself be pinned down in any way for what is to follow.

The hope that Freud has left religion an altar, upon whose steps one could take refuge, doesn’t last long. For we soon learn than religion is comparable to a childhood neurosis and the psychologist is optimistic enough to assume that the neurotic phase can be overcome. It is not certain, to be sure, but hope is clearly expressed (p. 47). The neurosis that religion represents is more precisely described as ‘the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity; like the obsessional neurosis of children, it arose out of the Oedipus complex, out of the relation to the father’ (p. 43). To this Freud linked the following prognosis: ‘If this view is right, it is to be supposed that a turning-away from religion is bound to occur with the fateful inevitability of a process of growth and that we find ourselves at this very juncture in the middle of that phase of development’ (p. 43).

The height of the objection is found in this sentence: ‘If, on the one hand, religion brings with it obsessional restrictions, exactly as an individual obsessional neurosis does, on the other hand it comprises a system of wishful illusions together with a disavowal of reality, such as we find in an isolated form nowhere else but in amnesia, in a state of blissful, hallucinatory confusion’ (p. 43).

Finally, religion is valued as a guardian of civilisation (p. 37), yet in this regard rejected as inadequate, especially since people have also not achieved through it the desired happiness and moral limits.

Let us look at these accusations more closely.

(2) Religion as Neurotic Compulsion

We begin with an investigation of the neurotic obsessional character that religion is supposed to have. Undoubtedly, in so far as many expressions of religious life are burdened with such a character, Freud was completely right and has, through his discovery, done an immense service for the psychology of religion. These compulsions are unmistakable in many primitive religions, which as yet have nothing of a proper ecclesiastical structure as in the various orthodoxies. We know too that this misfortune was laid in the cradle of religions as a result of instinctual repressions that evolved as a necessary demand from the biological progress of humanity. It is now the disagreeable fate of our species that what is simple and practical can usually be found only indirectly by the route of grotesque oddities. The history of languages and moral ideas reveals this as clearly as does the development of religions.
But even if it is difficult to deny this burden of compulsion in religion's very first stages, one must still ask if it belongs to religion's essence. Couldn't this collective neurotic trait very well fall away without harm, and even to the advantage of the whole, just as the tadpoles give up their tails so that as frogs they can hop about the world that much more comfortably?

Instinctual renunciations precede religion. But isn't this the case for all of civilisation? Whoever exhausts himself in an elemental way no longer has energy left for cultural accomplishments. If we imagine such a purely instinctual existence, which, moreover, is almost always denied to human nature through the wise frugality of nature and often through the Ash Wednesday protest as well, then we will not doubt for a single moment that while it corresponds to the essence of most animals, it does not to human nature. One understands the concept of nature in a one-sided and completely inadequate way if one comprehends it as 'naturalistic'. Nothing justifies the assumption that an animalistic vegetating corresponds better to the essence of a person than does civilised growth and activity. It is, after all, the natural world around us that makes a necessity of intellectual progress. Civilisation is always the product of two natures—that of that outside and that within the human. Civilisation is itself only developed human nature, however much the sorrows and renunciations that call it forth seem to represent consequences of nature. Whoever can free the concept of nature from its mistaken strictures will see in cultural development the same mutual adjustment of the person and the rest of the world that epistemology gives us proof of for the process of perception.

I am not in agreement with Freud's earlier assertion that renouncing the activity of egoistical drives lies at the basis of the development of religions, whereas neurosis assumes the repression of exclusively sexual functions (Freud, 1907, p. 210). The history of the oedipal relation, in particular, shows that sexuality makes up an integral part of ego drives and vice-versa. The separating-out of individual drives may only be undertaken as an abstraction; as soon as one really thinks of drives as separate (apart from their most primitive impulses), one commits error after error. 'This organic point of view', as I call the correct approach, is indispensable for the understanding of the origin of religion. I don't believe that there is still a difference here between Freud and myself. Since he now poses the negative father-relation as the main determinant of religion, he also allows the libido forces to prevail. I believe that one must seek the instinctual denials that lead to religion in a very broad context, just as, on the other hand, the paths that one takes in the development of religion exhibit an extraordinary variety.

Completely different complexes of determinants lie at the basis of the totem cult than, for example, of the social-ethical monotheism of the classical prophets of Israel; those underlying the aesthetic and pacifist Aton-belief of Akhena-ton are completely different from those of the piety of Spanish conquistadors. But instinctual denials that elicit more or less comprehensive and deep repression must, of course, have a part in the development of every religion.

But must compulsive structures really always be inherent in religion? I believe that, on the contrary, the highest religious developments in fact abolish coercion. One might think of genuine Christianity. Against compulsively neurotic nomism, which places a heavy burden with its dogmatism and embarrassing ceremoniousness, Jesus set his 'commandment' of love. 'You have learned how it was said—But I say this to you' (Matthew 5). There we have the powerful act of the Saviour. And it comes about not through any claim on one's commitment, but through the authority of that freedom won by virtue of triumphant love and knowledge of truth. Jesus overcame the collective neurosis of his people according to good psychoanalytical practice in that he introduced love—morally complete love, to be sure—into the centre of life. In his idea of the father, which is completely cleansed of the dross of the oedipal attachment, we see that the heteronomy and all the pain of being bound are overcome entirely. What is expected of people is nothing more than that which corresponds to their being and true destiny, furthers the common good and—in order to give space to
the biological point of view—establishes the optimal health of the individual and of the whole. It is a gross misunderstanding of Jesus’s basic commandment, “You must love God with all your heart and your neighbour as yourself” (Matthew 22: 37ff.), to see it as in the spirit of Mosaic law. The imperative form is retained, but who doesn’t notice the subtle irony with which the content, the loving, as something that can be achieved only voluntarily, dissolves the legal character?

How subtly Jesus practised psychoanalysis (one shouldn’t, in any case, use the expression too strictly), 1900 years before Freud, is something I have shown elsewhere (Analyt. Seelsorge [Psychoanalytic Ministry], Gottingen, 1927, pp. 20-4). Let me remind you that Jesus didn’t simply have an effect on the lame man’s symptom, but entered into the moral-religious conflict underlying it; settled it, and, thus, overcame the lameness from within. His belief in demons may alienate us as metaphysics, but as neurology we acknowledge it. The historical-psychological direction in which Jesus tests the Biblical coercive authority receives the complete approval of the analyst (e.g. Matthew 19: 8—The Mosaic commitment of the bill of divorce was enacted due to the hardness of the human heart). His handling of transference, which is assumed to be love, but is passed on to absolute, ideal accomplishments, so that no new attachment is formed, deserves the admiration of all Freud’s pupils, as does the dissolution of the fixation on one’s parents that leads to coercion—this through devotion to the absolute father, who is love.

Not that one should put Jesus forward as the first psychoanalyst in Freud’s sense, as some saucy young know-it-alls would perhaps like to do! But his redemptive ministry, in its basic traits, so decisively points in the direction of analysis that Christians should be ashamed to have left it to a non-Christian to make use of these radiant footprints. The reason, without a doubt, is that the obsessive neurotic bungling that threatens religion, like all other things formed by the human spirit, overwhelmed this wonderful trail too, just as was the case with the materialism of earlier psychiatry.

We could follow still further Jesus’s doing away with coercion and the weakening of its defining forces; we could show how his idea of the father is free from all reaction-symptoms compared with the oedipal hatred—and God shouldn’t be appeased with sacrifices, but instead be loved as one’s brother. We could call to mind that brotherly love in its deepest and broadest sense is the distinguishing characteristic and substance of Christian doctrine. We could recall that the goal and supreme good of all striving and longing do not lie in personal satisfaction, but in the kingdom of heaven, i.e. in the dominion of love, truth, and justice within the individual as in the universal community, etc. But we would digress too much.

And cannot something quite similar be said of the religion of Akhenaton and, in a certain sense, even of Buddha? Doesn’t a powerful principle of salvation lie within the basis of Protestantism, with its freedom of belief and of conscience, but also with its commandment of love—and this not only in the sense of being freed from religious coercion, but also as a general healing from force?

It is a great shame that Freud neglects the very highest expressions of religion. Biogenetically, it is not true that religion creates compulsions and holds a person fast in neurosis. Instead, it is the pre-religious life that creates neurotic compulsions, which then lead to appropriate religious ideas and rites. The magic that precedes religion is not yet religion. Then, however, there appears again and again precisely within the greatest development of religion—the Israelite-Christian—a religious inspiration (revelation) kindled by a higher, ethical and therefore also socio-biological insight. This insight strives to dissolve the coercion and bring about release until—under conditions that no one understands better than the analyst—again and again, through the distress of the age new bonds are forged that a later religious understanding is called upon to break. One can’t fail to recognise that there is a humanising process that corresponds to this religious struggle for salvation. Thus, there follow upon one another pre-Israelite animism and naturism, Mosaicism, Baalism, classical propheticism, post-exilic nomism (culminating in Pharisaism), the birth of Christianity, Catholicism, the Refor-
mation, early Protestant orthodoxy, Pietism, and Enlightenment, as well as the present-day offshoots of the different Christian coercive systems and systems to fight coercion. It is, however, worthy of notice that coercion-free individualism, specifically in the present, is strongly represented within Protestantism and, through its social pathos on the one hand, and its strict critical-scientific work on the other, has gained not a little attention from the other academic faculties.

It also shouldn’t be forgotten that religion definitely cannot develop in a self-contained way. If the Christians in various periods could compete in cruelty with the wildest barbarians, this did not happen as the result of a consistent application of their religious principles but as a result of neurotic illnesses that distorted and ravaged the Christian religion, just as research and artistic creation were exposed to and fell victim to the most horrible malformations.

Therefore, I deny flatly that a neurotic compulsive character is peculiar to religion as such.

(3) Religion as a Wishful Construct

For his idea that all religions represent only wishful constructs, Freud rightfully does not claim precedence (p. 27). With unsurpassable consistency, Feuerbach, almost ninety years ago, developed his thesis of theology as disguised anthropology and of religion as a dream (Feuerbach, 1841, p. 40). Yet Freud, with his microscope for souls, refined and strengthened extraordinarily these suppositions in many points. One shouldn’t deceive oneself here. Just the explanation of latent wishes and their recasting for the purpose of making-conscious, as well as the revelation of the oedipal situation and of repressed sadism and masochism, make it completely impossible to deny the presence of wishes in the development of religion. But can all of religious thinking be explained in this way? And is this mistaken exchange of wishes and essence a property peculiar to religion? Or shouldn’t in religion and science, and even finally in art and morality, the repression of wishful thinking through real thinking and the mobilisation of real thinking through wishful thinking create the ideal toward which intellectual development strives—panting, hoping, and painfully disappointed again and again?

Before we turn to Freud’s investigation, let us look for a common starting point. I will never forget that sunny Sunday morning in the spring of 1909 at the Belvedere Park in Vienna when Professor Freud pointed out to me, in his kindly, fatherly way, the dangers in the research he was conducting. Even then I said that I was prepared to give up the pastorate, which was dear to me, if the truth required it. To proclaim a belief that reason disproves or to fit out one’s mind as a residence of unbelief and one’s heart as the seat of belief seemed to me to be a juggler’s tricks, which I didn’t want anything to do with. I wouldn’t know what I might change in this attitude. One doesn’t risk one’s soul for an illusion.

I can meet Freud a good part of the way (Feuerbach also met with applause from theologians for his psychological criticism of religious doctrine; Pfeiderer, p. 449). That ideas of God and the beyond are often painted with colours from a wish-palette is something I have always known. When I found for the first time in a hallucinatory imagining of God the features of my father, of various pastors, etc. (Pfister, 1917, p. 222ff.) and behind them the direction of hatred, the clarity with which the connection could be shown was quite interesting, but I didn’t feel anything that was truly new and unexpected. I have known for a long time that the wishes of their authors are mirrored as much in the next life of the Eskimo, where whales are plentiful, or in the green hunting grounds of the Indians, inviting them to gain scalps, or in the Valhalla of the Teutons, with its richness in mead and graciousness to tournaments, as in the prayer-hall heaven of the Pietist, or in the other world of Goethe with its moral showdown.

Nemesis would have it that the atheists whom I have analysed were also led by wishful thinking extraordinarily often. Which analyst hasn’t often found atheists whose unbelief wasn’t a disguised doing-away-with of the father? I would, however, consider it wrong to squeeze all rejections of religion into a wish-schema.

And let us look more closely at the wishes that lead to religion. One must grant that, in
the beginning, they are largely of an egoistical nature. Could it be any different in the case of science? Could one expect a disinterested thirst for knowledge in primitive man? As early as the so-called child of nature, we see how the moral urge is active in cult and belief, e.g. the need to atone for a wrong that has been committed (e.g. of death-wishes against the father). With moral development, religious development also matures. The selfish wishes retreat more and more, even if there are relapses again and again into egoistical thinking—a sign that what is wild and primitive is rooted out only with difficulty.

The classical prophets of early Israel renounced personal immortality; their thoughts and endeavours were absorbed in the people to such an extent.

In the Gospel, we see instinctual wishes fought against in a powerful way and this becomes all the stronger as the development of Jesus proceeds in a steady battle with the tradition. We see the idea of reward, the idea of race, and the idea of the next life, with its colouration of sensuality all repressed, and the idea of reward, according to the view of psychoanalysis, is in fact repressed far more skilfully and wisely than in the rigorous philosophy of the categorical imperative, with its misguided pouring aside of love. What Jesus commanded in the name of his religion is, to a great extent, directly opposed to egoism; even if Jesus, with great wisdom, in no way proscribed self-love or encouraged masochism as it was practised by the ascetics. The gentleness and humility, the self-denial and rejection of the hoarding of wealth, the surrender of one’s own life for the highest moral values, in short, the entire way of living that he who was crucified at Golgotha demanded of his apostles, is diametrically opposed to the appetites of original human nature. It corresponds, however, to a higher view of human nature, as it certainly could not be derived from lowly instinctual demands, but rather only from an ideal-realism that has been acquired under bitter privations and arises from a magnificent, intuitive anthropology and cosmology. In Jesus’s prayer everything egoistical disappears. The petition for daily bread, this minimum of subsistence, is no longer egoistical; universal ethical ideals prevail and uppermost is the bowing to the divine will (‘Thy will be done’). This is not Buddhist willlessness, but nor is it pathogenetic introversion.

The assertion that, according to a Christian interpretation, everything that an earthly life denies to a Christian will be given in the next life is false. Abstention from sexual activity can be recouped in the afterlife according to Islam, but not according to Christianity.

Jesus stresses explicitly that sensual expectations for the life after death are to be ruled out (Matthew 22: 30). His highest ideal, the kingdom of God, has the earth as its setting and ideal ethical and religious values that have nothing to do with instinctual wishes as its content.

But, the antagonist may object, doesn’t religion then correspond at least to wishes of a higher sort? I reply: one needs to be clear about the difference between wish and postulate. The wish, in hallucinations or other visions that Freud has made understandable to us, is directed toward gratification, without being concerned about actual circumstances. In the same way, we are also familiar with many religious phenomena that make this illogical leap from desire to the assumption that something exists. Yet no one will claim that every wish achieves gratification only in such an illegitimate way. One can aim at the gratification of wishes in a way very much in keeping with reality.

Jesus felt within himself love-imperatives that contradicted the sanctified tradition. We can still observe exactly the stage at which he believed he could bring the claims of his inner demands into harmony with those of the ‘Mosaic’ commitment (Matthew 5: 17-22). But, as we have already learned (verses 27ff., 33ff., 38ff.), this view didn’t prevail everywhere. It had to come to an open break. The inner commandment had to countermand the outer one. But then this inner moral necessity itself had to come from God. And because it was directed toward love, God had to appear as loving and no longer as the strict, jealous God of the Old Testament. Thereby, the coercive nature of the Torah, which had instilled fear, also collapsed, as was shown above.

When we want to translate this event, which occurred intuitively and as an inspiration in
Jesus’s soul, into ponderous acts of cognition, we then approach the postulate. This does not say: I want this and that—hence, it is real. Rather it concludes: this and that is—what do I have to think of as real so that this certainly existing thing becomes comprehensible, could become real and can be real? The postulate begins with being, which is recognised or assumed as sure, and infers other being, which results from the former with logical necessity.

Natural science, with its hypotheses, which, with sufficient corroboration, are developed into theories, in a certain sense follows a similar route. But one is dealing here with the existential, from which progress is made toward other existential things. In a postulate, on the other hand, a valuation or imperative forms the starting point. Kant, for example, viewed the categorical ‘You should’ as the Archimedes point and postulated a lawyer from it. I myself begin with another ethical certainty that suggested itself to me specifically through psychoanalytic, as well as sociological, observation: from the decree to love one’s neighbour, oneself, and the absolute ideal. By this standard, which derives from the special character of the human being (because a ‘should’ lies in its being), I found the place from which I had to infer an absolute as the origin of being and of duty, as of all values. This philosophical procedure is basically nothing other than Jesus’s certainty of God, which was experiential and intuitive. That a number of wishes of one’s individual sort and even many ‘needs’ have to be sacrificed to the harsh knowledge of reality is obvious. And if the basis of the essence of the decree to love in its highest sense is itself determined to be intellectual and loving, is this then really contrary to thought?

Furthermore, this question is raised: isn’t the symbolic fantasy a charade-like, disguised medium of valid knowledge in science as well? Doesn’t scientific thinking also work with the harbingers of anthropomorphism, which express a great deal and, at the same time, hide a great deal?

I shall begin with the last problem mentioned. I can still remember the happy amazement with which I read Robitsek’s important study of the scientific accomplishments of the chemist Kekulé von Stradowitz, in the first volume of Imago (Robitsek, 1911). The structural—and benzene— theories grew out of visual phantoms of dancing couples and snakes; but the alert understanding had to test the dreams.

One should beware of immediately viewing as the product of wishes primitive ideas that seem fantastic to us objective thinkers of the twentieth century. If the wild man suspended a live animal in boiling water, which wish is it that was supposed to be guiding him? Wasn’t it understandable for him to explain the unfamiliar being as analogous to the movement of water familiar to him and caused by a hidden animal?

And when forces and beings similar to humans are projected into appearances and events in nature, is this an activity peculiar to religion, or don’t we find this process, which rests on conclusions drawn from analogies, even in the proudest halls of the natural sciences, indeed even in those of the yet more strictly disciplined philosophical thought? We speak of ‘strength’, ‘cause’, ‘effect’, ‘law’, and a hundred other concepts that epistemology has long since found to be rather clumsy, if indispensable, anthropomorphisms. Isn’t the concept of the ‘censor’ of the same sort?

The history of the sciences is that of an unceasing struggle with anthropomorphisms and other impermissible projections of known facts on to unknown ones. Why should religion and theology constitute an exception?

The question now, however, is whether theology, which concerns itself with religion, has remained stuck with one foot at the stage of wishes. If this is true, then I seriously fear (or should I hope?) that it shares this fate, deplorable for a science, with the other sciences, not excluding the natural sciences and history. I can assert this very definitely for philosophy (Pfister, 1923), and even if a surplus of pure objectivity can be granted to the rigorously exact natural sciences, they are lacking precisely that which empirico-criticism sought so passionately and so vainly: pure experience, from which the admixture of human subjectivity had been expunged. For this reason, study in the natural sciences ended with the bitter insight that one could recognise only a bit of the surface, which, one must grant, was a glittering
appearance. Colours evaporate into 'vibrations of the atmosphere', with one adding resignedly that the atmosphere is a very dubious auxiliary concept; tones reveal themselves as oscillations of the air, whose combination as melody or symphony has no place in documents and in the world of the natural sciences. The atom, which for several thousand years of experimentation and thought was recognised plainly as a simple and unchangeable little chunk of reality and had been elevated to the position of the carrier of a Weltanschauung that supposedly rested on a scientific foundation, one morning came to nothing, like a piece of coal; in fact, it changed into another element. The law of nature revealed itself to more modern scientific criticism as the product of the wish that a process would always occur in the same way, assuming similar conditions. Just think of the embarrassment of mechanical engineers and bridge-builders if this were not the case. If the revolutionary views of the newest and critical natural sciences have yielded something that is certain, it is the insight that in their area we have remained up to our necks in wishes, and pragmatism, however much one dismisses it disdainfully, at least possesses the good quality of uncovering the interest of the practical American in a productive use of reality, i.e. it revealed the wishes in the background of knowledge.

Theology has abundantly shown itself more than a little prepared and able to give up wishful thinking. I find, however, that it is more practical to prove this at the conclusion of our friendly disagreement. But along with theology, religion also underwent sacrifices that were of the most uncompromising and most painful sort in regard to wishing.

Furthermore, it shouldn’t be overlooked that religion, from the beginning, has been very able to incorporate knowledge about nature and about values. Whoever ridicules the quiet, standing son of Joshua should have been aware that the concept of a firmly attached and closed natural order did not yet exist in those times, but first became a part of science more than two-and-a-half millennia later, until, a short time ago, it again lost more than a little of its standing. Christiandom fought against Copernicus and the theory of evolution for a long time—too long—but it finally came to terms with them. One shouldn’t take it amiss that it doesn’t go along with all scientific fads. A number of outstanding scientists down to the present have no difficulty in reconciling religion and science, whereas the semi-educated are, in any case, more likely than great researchers of Freud’s rank to announce the incompatibility of the two areas at the beer-table.

Nothing is thereby proven for the truth or untruth of religion.

Yet how do matters stand with the contradictions of religious thought? I have already spoken of the honest endeavour of modern theology to overcome these contradictions. Whether or not it has succeeded is difficult to determine. I believe that I have attained a piety that has mastered the contradictions, even if, as in any other area of human thought, unsolved riddles have remained at every step. But now I turn the tables and ask: isn’t empirical science bursting with contradictions as thick as your fist? I won’t even point to conceptual cripples like the atmosphere, which is supposed to be matter without consisting of atoms, and yet which the most respectable scientists greeted most humbly and obediently as an overlord. But perhaps it makes some impression, however, that very important scientific researchers and psychologists, e.g. Herbart and Wundt, recommend no other task for philosophy than the elimination of the contradictions to be found in experiential concepts and the bringing of these cleansed concepts into harmony with each other. One should, however, also proceed more cautiously with the religion of the uneducated and of the theologians.

Since Freud didn’t intend to concern himself with the individual contradictions and limited himself to declaring most religious teachings to be undemonstrable and irrefutable, I cannot concern myself with a defence of religious reality-thinking in detail. When we recall how modestly present-day science has learned to think about the realm of things that really can be demonstrated, then we must admit that in the problem at hand the greatest caution is urgently indicated, so that we don’t demand from other academic faculties what we haven’t achieved in our own and don’t reproach others for that
which we commit ourselves. With what exemplary restraint has Freud spoken about what has been proven of his ideas! We must also be very careful not to consider agreement amongst scholars to be the same as balance and validity of a doctrine. It is often merely a result of fatigue, and the gravedigger’s feet, perhaps already stand at the door.

Under such circumstances, which make our truly scientific assets seem somewhat doubtful compared with the liabilities, we must, more than ever, beware of the danger of trickery. Through wishful thinking and tolerance of contradictions, one would not end up with a more favourable balance sheet, but might endanger one’s credit even more. But there seems to be no reason to invest one’s entire fortune in the sole bank of science and to give out all other cultural goods as if they were superfluous. More about this later.

When Freud reproaches religion for its hallucinatory confusion, he is undeniably correct for some, indeed for many, of its forms. But does this apply to all forms of piety? I don’t understand it. Again the great master seems to have very specific forms in mind and to be generalising from them. I almost believe that he was seldom a guest at Protestant services and also seldom honoured critical theology with his visit. We analysts especially, as we take up for the first time the psychology of genius with complete seriousness, know very well, after all, that something very great and deep can lie behind the hallucinatory confusion. When Paul states that his sermon about the crucifixion seemed foolishness to the heathens (1 Corinthians 1:23), this is not a counter-argument for him. For me, a creative Dionysian or an Apollonian fiery spirit, who pours out his offerings not as mellow wine but as fermenting new wine, is worth far more than a sober scholar who uses up his life’s strength in a sterile juggling of concepts and in pedantic exactitude. The degree of rationality is not necessarily the measure of value. Stormy youth, with all its follies and foolishness, still has more than a little advantage over prudent age. One can’t wait patiently with food and drink until the physiologist-gentlemen have completed their analyses of foods and elaborated their nutritional theories to the satisfaction of each and every one. The baths containing radium did good service for a few centuries before we discovered radium and, thereby, the cause of the therapeutic success. Is it unthinkable that, in the domain of the intellect, knowledge of causes limps, panting heavily, behind the possession of valuable goods? It seems to me, to be frank about it, that in present-day Protestantism, with its excessively strict and sharp criticism, we have retained too little, rather than too much, of the Platonic frenzy and the Paulist scandal. And yet I, for my part, cannot do otherwise than carry out the reality principle with unrelenting strictness, if in constant uneasiness about losing costly goods through the mesh of scientific conceptualising.

And let us not forget that one can reject scientific hypotheses; in practical matters, on whose answers the development of a life depends, one must take up a position even where stringent proofs are lacking. How else can one start a family, seize upon a profession, etc.? Thus, in religion too there is embedded a trust, but woe to him who marries only according to wishes, or chooses a profession and assumes a religious belief without taking reality into account with scrupulous care!

(4) Religion as Hostile to Thought

That religion in itself is supposed to be hostile to thought is something that I cannot accept. Freud wrote, ‘When we ask on what their claim to be believed is founded, we are met with three answers which harmonise remarkably badly with one another. Firstly, these teachings deserve to be believed because they were already believed by our primal ancestors; secondly, we possess proofs which have been handed down to us from those same primal times; and, thirdly, it is forbidden to raise the question of their authentication at all’ (p. 26). Granted, such dreadful argumentation has occurred here and there. But what educated Christian would want to be put off in such a way today? Certainly not we Protestants. We criticise the Bible and dogmas as radically as did Homer or Aristotle. As far as the Catholics are concerned, they at least preface their dogmatics with an apologetics that is intended to satisfy
the demands of reason. As a philosopher, one may challenge their logical necessity; as a pupil of Freud, diagnose them as rationalisation; as a Protestant, reject at least a portion of the whole as *lettre de cachet*. Yet a work of thought still remains that commands respect.

We Protestants know far too well how much our religion owes to thought for us to deny it its full scope. Even if Luther didn't grant to reason the rights that are due it, nevertheless he was a theologian and scientific thinker; otherwise, he never would have become a reformer. Zwingli passed through the humanistic school, which contributed to his theology and piety not only their gentleness, but also their clarity. Even the gloomy Calvin, Geneva's sinister grand inquisitor, made his juridical thinking accessible to his fortress-like theology. The religion of the reformers was also the result of their scientifically-trained professorial thinking. Newer theology, which could—and still can—boast of many accomplishments in radical denial, is aware of rendering the most excellent services to religion precisely by means of its strict realistic thinking. I have never heard in my surroundings of the prohibition against meditating on religious things. On the contrary, we Protestant pastors encourage independent critical thinking from our pupils. In the case of pastors of liberal tendency, this is taken for granted, but I know of it even amongst many conservative ones. We calm frightened persons who are experiencing a crisis of belief with the assurance that God loves the sincere doubter and that a belief made more secure through thought is more valuable than one which has simply been taken over and taught. We also encourage and cultivate independent thinking in the religion of adults.

Thought is supposed to be weakened by religion, according to Freud. To be sure, he adds immediately that the effect of the religious prohibition on thought is perhaps not as bad as he assumes (p. 44). In a historical sense, one should point out that, without question, there has been a long chain of the deepest and freest spirits, who have enriched the intellectual life of humanity enormously, who were in agreement with religion and science at the same time, and I cannot believe that Freud assumes that they would have created yet greater things if they had never heard anything of religion. Physicians such as Hermann Lotze, Wundt, Kocher; physicists such as Descartes, Newton, Faraday, Robert Mayer; chemists such as Justus Liebig; biologists such as Oswald Heer, Darwin, Pasteur, K. E. von Bähr; mathematicians such as Leibniz, Pascal, Gauss; geographers such as Ritter; historians such as Johannes von Müller, Carlyle, Niebuhr, L. von Ranke; statesmen such as Lincoln, Gladstone, Bismarck; philosophers such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, Ruskin, Eucken, Bergson; writers such as Goethe, Schiller, Rückert, Bitzius, Gottfried Keller, K. F. Meyer, Geibel—from a long chain of brilliant names I am choosing just a few quite hastily. They betray, however, no defects in intelligence, although they believed in God and I really wouldn't know what might justify the supposition that their minds might have risen to even greater achievements if they had never encountered religion. A portion of those names is certainly far above the average believer in their religious fervour, whereas the contrary might actually be assumed in view of their intellectual feats, if the danger of becoming dumb were so closely linked to religion.

We may at this point also point out that even in the very recent past important scientists, specifically through thought, came to feel it was certain, or at least probable, that there was a constructive world-design (Einstein, Becher, Driesch). But we won't base the evidence for the truth of religion on these authorities either.

Freud had stressed previously that children's intellectual drive would be damaged if their questions about the origin of objects in nature were answered with a summary reference to God. I agree with him, but would like to ask if the result would be different if one said, 'Nature created them', and then I emphasise that in religious instruction one always points out how God has an effect through the workings of nature and through human activity.

I myself remember how my own thinking was richly enhanced by religion. Innumerable intellectual problems that simply had to be worked on, because one may not stick one's head in the sand where life is concerned, were stimulated; splendid historical figures were presented
to me; my sensibility for greatness and moral necessity was developed. I would view it as an irreparably grave loss if religious memories were wrenched from my life. And that the Bible was described to me as the infallible word of God sharpened my thinking. I can still remember how, as a 12-year-old, after a reading of the story of the flood, I ran into the zoological museum in order to compare the measurements of the ark with those of the glass cases and to base a childlike theory of evolution on this, but, at the same time, assuming a sceptical attitude toward the Bible, which later changed into frank criticism.

As far as Freud's suggested experiment of a religion-free instruction is concerned, it has certainly been tried very often and has been arranged on a mass-scale in communist circles for many years. In my analytical practice I was often involved with people who had been brought up without religion, but I really cannot claim that I encountered a surplus of intelligence or, as the case may be, a more advantageous development of intellectual tendencies, as little as I have recognised the atheists among the philosophers as the superior ones, e.g. a Karl Vogt or Moleschott (Häckel could be included here too, with reservations). History has, in any case, pronounced another verdict until now.

(5) Religion as a Guardian of Civilisation

In remains for us to examine religion as a guardian of civilisation. Freud thereby expected a police-like mission for religion. 'Religion has clearly performed great services for human civilisation. It has contributed much towards the taming of the asocial instincts. But not enough. It has ruled human society for many thousands of years and has had time to show what it can achieve. If it had succeeded in making the majority of mankind happy, in comforting them, in reconciling them to life and in making them into vehicles of civilisation, no one would dream of attempting to alter the existing conditions. But what do we see instead? We see that an appallingly large number of people are dissatisfied with civilisation and unhappy in it, and feel it as a yoke which must be shaken off; and that these people either do everything in their power to change this civilisation, or else go so far in their hostility to it that they will have nothing to do with civilisation or with a restriction of instinct' (p. 39).

I can agree completely with Freud in the view that religion sometimes doesn't at all give an excellent account of itself as civilisation's police. But let me add that I find it fortunate that this is the case, for religion has more important things to do than to protect the mixture of the lofty and the abominable that we call civilisation today.

Under civilisation Freud understands 'all those respects in which human life has lifted itself above its animal status and differs from the life of beasts' (p. 6). The distinction between culture and civilisation is rejected. 'It includes, on the one hand, all the knowledge and capacity that men have acquired in order to control the forces of nature and extract its wealth for the satisfaction of human needs, and, on the other hand, all the regulations necessary in order to adjust the relations of men to one another and especially the distribution of the available wealth' (p. 6).

I must admit that, in my opinion, there is much that is shameful and harmful in that which raises the human being above the animal. The knowledge and abilities, the wealth for the satisfaction of human needs, the regulations for the arrangement of social relations and the distribution of wealth—all seem to me to be so permeated with cruelty, injustice, and poisonous germs that religion really has no cause to stand up for the maintenance of the status quo. War, the spirit of Mammon, love of pleasure, the poverty of the masses, exploitation, oppression, and innumerable other wrongs between what is good and worthy of protection and what is evil and must be fought against. It even seems to me that a Christianity that is to be taken seriously must strive toward the most fundamental changes in our culture, which is alienated and stunted in its inner values, especially emotional ones. The study of psychoanalysis has strengthened me in this opinion. Religion should become for us not a police force that conserves, but a leader and beacon toward true civilisation from our sham civilisation.
It would also seem to me to be unworthy of religion when one, with Freud, allots it the task of offering consolation for the instinctual renunciations required by civilisation, of providing, so to speak, muzzles or handcuffs for the asocial masses (p. 37). The taming of animal instincts (to the extent that they are detrimental to human well-being and dignity) may, instead, be only the reverse side of a solution to a positive task: religion should release the highest intellectual and emotional strengths; should bring forth the greatest achievements in art and science; should fill the lives of all people, even the poorest, with the greatest treasures of truth, beauty, and love; should help to overcome the real stresses of life; should pave the way for new, more substantive and genuine forms of social life, and thus call into being a higher, inwardly richer humanity, which corresponds more closely to the true claims of human nature and of ethics than our much-praised uncivilisation, which Nietzsche already has called a thin apple-peel over a blazing chaos. One completely misunderstands the essence of Christianity if one thinks that it offers us a substitute for an earth abandoned to its misery. ‘To us may Thy kingdom come’ states the Lord’s Prayer, and imposes the obligation of exerting all of one’s strength on behalf of this earthly kingdom of God, as much as the Gospel’s commandments are very much concerned with this life. ‘Before you leave an offering before the altar, go first and be reconciled with your brother’ demands the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5: 24). Jesus is not to blame that Christianity has misunderstood this so often. Freud has given us the opportunity to understand why the intentions of the founder of the Christian religion have often been distorted into a caricature through a compulsively neurotic development.

There is no more genuine realism than Christianity. But it shouldn’t be forgotten that reality is made up not only of the tangible, which can be perceived with our sense of smell and other small windows to the soul, but also what is hidden behind the small windows at the foundation of the soul and behind the sources of what stimulates the senses. A somewhat more penetrating look-into-the-essence-and-value philosophy is, to be sure, needed in order to recognise that neglect of the higher realities that lie beyond the tangible and solid only leads to a bad realism. For that reason we will put off this problem for a moment.

**Freud’s Scientism**

(1) *The Belief in a Science that Makes People Happy*

In contrast to religious belief, Freud posits the belief in the power of science (by which he means only empirical science) to make people happy. Here illusion has yielded to truth. In this connection, the question ‘What is science?’ apparently causes him less concern than did the parallel consideration ‘What is truth?’ for Pilate. Freud is a positivist and we can thank God for that. Without his concentrated devotion to the empirical, he would not have become the great pioneer. One can forgive such a successful and brilliant pioneer if, at the moment when he attempts to smother religious illusion, he establishes the Messiahship of science, without noticing that in this belief illusion also struts.

We will first let the master have the word. Freud is too subtle a thinker blindly to commit himself to the vulgar, uncritical belief in the omnipotence of the natural sciences. He doesn’t shrink from the question of ‘whether our conviction that we can learn something about external reality through the use of observation and reasoning in scientific work’ has a sufficient basis (p. 34). In true philosophical fashion he continues: ‘Nothing ought to keep us from directing our observation to our own selves, or from applying thought to criticism of itself. In this field a number of investigations open out before us, whose results could not but be decisive for the construction of a Weltanschauung. We surmise, moreover, that such an effort will not be wasted and that it would at last in part justify our suspicion’ (p. 34). ‘But the author does not dispense of the means for undertaking so comprehensive a task; he needs must confine his work to fol-
lowing out one only of these illusions—that, namely, of religion’ (p. 34).

Later, however, empirical science is viewed with an optimism that rises to bold perspectives on the future. After abandoning religion, people will extend their power with the help of science and learn to bear the great necessities of fate with resignation (p. 50).

To be sure, Freud admits immediately that this hope may also be of an illusory nature (p. 53). How is that? Is it possible that we have to exchange the religious illusion for the scientific one? Could the difference be that the one is secure and the other perhaps makes fools of us? Would we, therefore, still remain in a condition of uncertainty and the last word is that of scepticism, which at least does not doubt that doubt itself has a fully logical justification?

Yet Freud shows that not only religion is able to console. Chivalrously, he enters the lists for the intellect: ‘The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind, but it is in itself a point of no small importance. And from it one can derive yet other hopes. The primacy of the intellect lies, it is true, in a distant, distant, future, but probably not in an infinitely distant one. It will presumably set itself the same aims as those whose realisation you expect from your God (of course within human limits, so far as external reality, ‘νοσογνωσία, allows it), namely the love of man and the decrease of suffering. This being so we may tell ourselves that our antagonism is only a temporary one, and not irreconcilable. We desire the same things, but you are more impatient, more exacting, and—why should I not say it?—more self-seeking than I and those on my side. You would have the state of bliss begin right after death ...’ (pp. 53-4). ‘We believe that it is possible for scientific work to gain some knowledge about the reality of the world by means of which we can increase our power and in accordance with which we can arrange our life. If this belief is an illusion, then we are in the same position as you. But science has given us evidence by its numerous and important successes that it is no illusion’ (p. 55). ‘No, our science is no illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere’ (p. 56).

With this magnificently logical sentence Freud closes his prophecy about the downfall of religion and the glorious sole reign of science. The god Logos puts the god of religion off his throne and reigns in the realm of necessity, about the sense of which we for the time being know not the slightest thing.

(2) Historical Examination

Let us hastily recall that this ideal of science, as Freud surely knows well, itself looks back upon a venerable past. Only the creator of psychoanalysis perhaps has made a certain pointed emphasis, in so far as in his positivism he has sealed off the concept of science against philosophy more tightly than has until now been usual. His empiricism is completely different from that of the English empiricists, who seized the world of experience with great exactitude but, alongside this, left control in action to natural instinct and conscience, or even, like John Stuart Mill, who had an absolutely irreligious upbringing, nevertheless finally sought reference to religion (Pfleiderer, p. 606). The Future of an Illusion also diverges totally from positivism, such as that of Auguste Comte, who shatters first the mythological, then the metaphysical steps of thought, so as to sing the praise of the individual sciences, in which alone salvation is to be found, but then however wants to explain the world starting from the human moral feeling and constructs a highly romantic and fantastic religion of humanity, a really entertaining piece of evidence for his failure to get by with his scientism, which decidedly rests on a broad foundation. Also David Freidrich Strauss, who seems to come fairly close to Freud with his mechanical materialism, and only in his assumption of a 'rational and kindly universe' makes a side-trip into the philosophical, in which the opponent of the illusion of religion could hardly accompany him, demands an ethic which in no way finds full satisfaction in scientific produc-
tion. Of the philosophers known to me, the one who comes closest to Freud is Baron von Holbach, who had already derived the development of the idea of God from the wish, made forces in nature accessible by means of humanisation to influence through prayer and sacrifice, who challenged the usefulness of religion and, therefore, wanted to put an end to it, and posited continuing happiness as the object of striving (Falckenberg, p. 208ff.). It is obvious that Freud towers over the materialists of the eighteenth century as an empiricist and that he abstains from his banal metaphysics.

(3) Freud’s Optimism about Science

We now face the task of examining Freud’s optimism about science. First, we must consider what he understands under science and how far his optimism goes.

On the first point, we get no more detailed information. Until now, the attitude of the greatest of the modern pioneers in the field of mental life was decisively negative toward philosophy. Now, however, I learn to my satisfaction that Freud allows a basic justification for epistemology in so far as it undertakes to answer the question of whether we can learn something about external reality. Freud, to be sure, modestly declines the task, as we have already heard; yet he still explains that science should limit itself to a depiction of the world as it must appear to us as a result of the peculiar character of our makeup (p. 56) and that the problem of the nature of the world, if one does not take our percipient mental apparatus into account, is an empty abstraction (p. 56).

Freud seems there to have provided epistemological results that are not preceded by epistemology. He takes for granted that we are dealing only with the world of appearances. Yet doesn’t the essence of science everywhere consist in dissolving this world of appearances and contrasting it with abstractions that first impart understanding to us for that world of the senses? Optics, as we have already heard, dissolves colours into vibrations of colourless ‘bodies’, which are again robbed of their substantuality by physics and chemistry and are separated into energies, electrons, and other non-material, abstract constructs. Causality is something we can nowhere see and smell; we interpret it into appearances.

It should be made clear that the ‘percipient mental apparatus’, which, according to Freud, all investigators of the nature of the world have to take into account, is by no means a clear structure to be safeguarded against deception. Can I measure temperatures with the thermometer without being certain that the instrument is reliable? Is one permitted to ignore the entire modern history of philosophy, which begins with Descartes’s absolute scepticism, then with Hume destroys the illusion of a guaranteed causality, with Kant overturns the illusion of empirical knowledge as that of an understanding of the world in itself, and in the most modern natural science conjures up a veritable twilight of false gods? Hasn’t one realised yet the sort of scientific labyrinths one is getting into when epistemological and metaphysical concepts are glibly taken over under the deceptive heading of natural science? Have we forgotten how natural science deceived us with its concept of a law of nature, of the atom, of the atmosphere, of Laplace’s world-formula, etc.?

Natural science without metaphysics doesn’t exist, has never existed, and will never exist. I myself have passed through the school of empirico-criticism and, for a few semesters, sought ‘pure experience’ in the sense of knowledge of reality that was completely free from all subjective ingredients. What a vain pursuit! The world is accessible to us only through our intellectual makeup and, in fact, not only through the gates of the senses, which yield no knowledge as yet. Our categories of thought, whether one considers them according to Kant’s method or in some other way, always play a part. Therefore, we must engage in criticism of knowledge. Moreover, we need concepts like cause and effect, although they have been discovered to have their origin in anthropomorphisms; we need atoms and molecules, etc. If abstractions are to be avoided, one must keep one’s fingers away from science. Even the measuring and weighing has to do
with abstractions, for numerical concepts are, of course, like all concepts, abstract. Philosophy, which begins as soon as experience ends, extends into the empirical sciences and whoever doesn't seriously come to grips with philosophical problems will do it in an amateur, confused way.

In addition, how can the religious problem be taken care of if basic epistemological questions are left out of account? Isn't it simply a negative dogmatism to declare, by means of a dictum torn from the fence, that a world-will and a world-meaning do not exist?

If one believes that philosophy is the mania of minds far removed from life and reality, it should be pointed out that the history of philosophy, however, exhibits a list of brilliant names of men who had accomplished something in physics, mathematics, astronomy, etc. If today a great scientist with the standing of a Driesch, who engaged in natural science for twenty years to great acclaim, went over to philosophy and psychiatrists chose the same route, this would show that philosophy is involved not only with fads and whims but also with a reality whose existence cannot be dismissed with a wave of the hand. In my opinion, this world of intellectual order, which can be deduced from the world of appearances, stands more securely before us than the world of the senses, which is undeniably deceptive. We can make it easy for ourselves and embrace agnosticism. But neither is this bankruptcy of thought made so easy for one.

Thus, I don't know through Freud's generally accessible concept of science how far knowledge extends, what degree of reliability it can establish, and what opportunities are allotted to it. How should I know, therefore, whether or not there is a primary cause and an ordering, i.e., thinking, world-will? How can I know if the extension of power through knowledge means an increase in happiness for humanity?

We can now come to grips with Freud's prognosis for science. One can't speak of a rosy-fingered Eos that he gives to us. Freud is much too serious and honest a man to make promises that he isn't convinced he can keep. People will, with the help of science, extend their power—how far, we don't find out—and learn to bear the great necessities of fate with resignation. This is absolutely all. But hasn't Freud thereby said too much? Can't civilisation soon collapse? Hasn't the fall of the Western world been prophesised by a man whose great knowledge is recognised in every quarter? Is it unthinkable that civilisation that is guided only by science will succumb to wild passions after the World War has revealed to us the barbarism lurking in the depths of nations? Don't Eduard von Hartmann and many others assure us that the growth of science only increases our misery? Has it been settled so definitely that progress in the sciences until now has increased the sum total of human joy in life and, if this were the case so far, is it certain that it will always be so? Is it certain that we are happier than we were one hundred years ago? Is this at least the case with scholars? Do workers, thanks to the blessings of science, find themselves more satisfied than a few generations ago? Or the artisans? Or the farmers? What will become of the most beautiful characteristics of technology when they are forced into the service of the human hunger for money, of human cruelty, of inhuman dissipation?

Freud's prognosis for science rests on a merely analogous conclusion that I don't consider certain. It is as follows: because progress in science has until now brought advantages to human beings, that will henceforth also be the case. Or better expressed, there is in the background a belief in science whose basis Nietzsche espied with his eagle's eye and stated thus: 'One will have understood ... that there still is a metaphysical belief on which our belief in science rests—that we perceiving people of today, we godless and anti-metaphysical people, also still take our fire from the blaze that a millennia-old belief ignited, that Christian belief that was also Plato's belief, that God is the truth, that the truth is godly ... But what happens if this becomes more and more unworthy of belief ...?' (Nietzsche, 1886, p. 301).

Do you know through an oracle that knowledge always contributes to an increase in human happiness, even if evil passions turns the scale? Byron complained that 'The tree of knowledge is not the tree of life!' Can exact knowledge refute him? And when a Faustian craving for knowledge inspires us, can natural science and medi-
cine (philosophy and theology excluded) satisfy us today or would the heart of a modern-day Faust nearly be consumed?

Freud anticipated that one will have to learn to bear the great necessities of fate with resignation. Well, this is something that many people have always been able to do without science and if I bow before the greatness of mind of the religion-less man who encounters this submission, who can tell me that and why submission specifically has to be the last word? Some people blew out their brains in desperation, although they stood on the proud pinnacles of science. Others railed against life with a wild hatred and tried to distract themselves through excesses; others withdrew, either with or without an attractive invitation, into a mysticism that is hostile to the world, etc.

Couldn’t there be a wish hidden behind Freud’s belief in the ultimate victory of the intellect and couldn’t his prophecy of the end of an illusion include the parade of a new illusion, namely a scientific one? That the parade, in Freud’s case, won’t proceed with fife and drum and with flags waving, but instead in a very subdued way and with halting steps, suits his modesty. But I can’t join in for the very reason that the reality principle with a warning blocks my path.

(4) Freud’s Belief in the Adequacy of Science

‘An illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere’ (p. 56). Freud’s creed culminates in these words. From the context it is clear that he has in mind knowledge about the world. The arrangement of the whole book, however, betrays that he here, as earlier (p. 46), is also thinking of the substitute, and without reservation, for that which religion offers its adherents.

As joyfully and enthusiastically as I follow Freud on the wonderful paths of his empirical science, at this point it is impossible for me to keep step with him. Here Freud’s brilliant intellect soars to an intellectualty that, intoxicated by its successes, forgets its limits.

We human beings are not only thinking devices; we are living, feeling, desiring beings. We need goods and values; we have to have something that satisfies our emotions, that stimulates our aspirations. Thought too must offer us values, logical ones—but others as well. Haven’t we often dealt in analysis with clear-thinking people who, in their thinking, are almost starving and desperate? Don’t we bear within us a conscience that judges or rewards us? Hasn’t the power of guilt feelings been proven specifically through psychoanalysis? Doesn’t Freud show more clearly than anyone else in the world the paramount importance of valuation, of feelings, affects and drives?

As is well known, the intellect doesn’t know how to make value judgements. The sharpest intelligence cannot state whether a symphony by Mahler or a painting by Hodler is beautiful. The cleverest person, without internal contradiction, can salute a vile betrayal and scoff at a hero’s death in the cause of truth. A heartless scoundrel can have a clear-sighted intelligence at his disposal, and an imbecile become upset at treachery. Science lacks the ability to assess aesthetic and ethical values. Yet, one seems to hear an echo of Aristotle’s definition of the brain as a cooling apparatus whenever thought—not only with Spinoza—is characterised or praised as an activity that subdues the emotions.

It’s obvious that Freud had to provide a place somewhere in his scientific life-structure for the emotional values of which his own life displays such a wonderful richness. But I don’t find the place in his concept of science.

I also don’t see where he lets the temple of art stand. Might art be only a sign of weakness and lack of analysis? Could science make up for the loss of Beethoven’s symphonies or Reger’s sonatas? And the glorious works of Egyptian, Hellenic, Christian art—we are supposed to sacrifice them for scientific doctrines and inventions? The glorious domes and cathedrals, which constitute the pride and delight of our species; the paintings, inspired by Christian feeling, of a Fra Angelico, Leonardo da Vinci, Albrecht Dürer, Holbein, up to Gebhardt, Thoma, Steinhausen, the ‘Pieta’ of a Michelangelo, the thief or the prodigal son of a Meunier, etc.—all these should disappear? The spirit of Christian poesy, as it
A FRIENDLY DISAGREEMENT WITH PROF. SIGMUND FREUD

dispatches its silver waves in Lessing’s Nathan, Goethe’s Faust, Dostoevsky’s Idiot, Tolstoy’s Resurrection, etc. must dry up and, instead of green pastures, there remains only the mooerland of theory on which the ghosts of error flutter about menacingly? For the sceptic, who is not even able, with Faust, to sigh ‘Oh, happy is whoever can hope to emerge from this sea of error!’—would stubbornly hold before such a person the glorious future of science in coming millennia?

For me, art is still the herald, blessed with a prophetic gift, of deep secrets and the revealer of costly treasures that now, and in the future, escape the scholar’s spectacles; it is a wonder of nourishment for hungry souls; a message of peace from the realm of ideas which no thinker’s fist can ever tear to pieces because they belong more securely to true reality than do tangible things and other pretences of the senses. In order to work this out intellectually, I would need lengthy arguments in which the intellect would be allotted only the role of a commentator who serves and renders homage to the creating genius. Oh, how I dread a scholars’ state emptied of art!

And even less can ingenious science replace for us the realm of moral values and strengths. Science must itself be incorporated into a moral setting of goals if it isn’t to sink to the level of a dubious undertaking. Who could argue with Freud, in his booklet, if I am correct, that no place is accorded to this comprehensive observation. We no longer stand on the Socratic basis of the teaching that knowledge already represents power. The alcoholic man who knows that he will go to ruin through his vice doesn’t therefore have the strength to break with it. The analytic insight into the dynamic of the unconscious and into its deepest roots also, as we know today, doesn’t in itself help to free one from its domination; Freud teaches us that, through transference, the drives that are wedged in so tightly must also be released.

Has it really been decided that with the growth of science the opinions of human beings will also be ennobled? Hasn’t Alexander von Ottingen proven that there are proportionately more criminals precisely among the well-educated than among the intellectually aver-
age? Don’t we find now and then among academics an unbelievable meanness of spirit? When the primary school was founded almost one hundred years ago, a rapid decline in criminality was expected. And today?

Where do we get the certainty that in the future the growth in science and technology will conjure up an increase in moral strength? In fighting against alcoholism, I experienced clearly enough how little is to be achieved with scientific arguments. And even if the displacements are thought to be overcome, that morality that gives dignity and true inner health to life cannot be obtained with the guide- rope of science.

Thereby I have stated the reason why I do not believe in the replacement of religion through science. Religion is the sun that pushes forth the most glorious blossom-life of art and the most abundant harvest of moral sentiments. All great and powerful art is prayer and an offering before God’s throne. God, for the philosopher of religion the real realistic substantive basis of ideals, is, for the pious man, the ideal basis of his real creation, the Pentecostal spirit, which descends upon earth in tongues of fire; the revelator, whose ‘Let there be light!’ also illuminates the darkness of human spirits with blinding clarity. Whoever would destroy religion would cut through the tap-root of great art, which discloses the deepest meaning and the greatest strengths of life.

And, in the same way, we see in religion a supporting pillar of morality. We don’t overlook the fact that devout belief incorporated moral insight and continuously does so, as, for example, the history of Christianity teaches. But we also are not forgetting that the boldest and most glorious ethical advances could begin only as religion. Not scientists, but rather the founders of religion are to be thanked for the great advances in ethics. Kant too, who, with his exclusion of love represents a dangerous regression from the ethics of Jesus, is basically just the educated spokesman for Protestantism that has turned away into the puritanical.

It has not even been settled that ethics itself is involved in a progressive involvement. I cannot agree with Freud’s sentence that what is moral is always obvious. As is well known, one certainly cannot simply depend on the
conscience and in the science of ethics the most diverse doctrines gesticulate excitingly toward each other. A plain utilitarian morality seems an abomination to the Kantian; eudaemonism, with its ambiguous obscurities, irritates the Nietzschean, who wants the will to power to be the standard of good and evil and canonises it, etc. In individual ethical problems we see a chaos of contradictory views; one could think here of the moral judgement about war, excessive accumulation of capital, free love, induced abortion, etc. Positivistic thinking, science as Freud seems to have it in mind, certainly cannot bring us much further, even if, as I have elaborated elsewhere, it can also provide us with extremely valuable components for ethics, which will always remain a philosophical discipline and, in fact, next to sociology, first and foremost for Freud's psychoanalysis. Recently, I heard at a public discussion the Viennese jurist Kelsen state that positivism is not even able to create legislation (Kelsen is himself a positivist); how should it then be at all able to call an ethical system into being!

Empirical science thus forsakes us as far as the development of ethical concepts is concerned. And more important is that the creation of moral life has never yet been achieved with sterile theories and clever concepts. It would be pedantry of the worst sort to fail to recognise this. Religion, with its in part lofty and in part chaining symbols; with its poetic splendour and its immensely moving interpretations of reality; with its captivating personalities who, through deeds that win our hearts and through suffering hold power over us and, through their failings and weaknesses in part warn, yet in part give courage again to the fallen human being to seek an ideal with new strength; religion with its immense metaphysical background and future perspectives; with its divine sanction for the moral commandment and its message of salvation, which anticipates some of the most important characteristics of psychoanalysis; with its demands, which overcome all resistance of the empirical world through the certainty of a higher duty and alliance—in short, this whole ideal world which, however, is certain in being only the expression of a higher, highest, reality and which can easily incorporate all gifts of science, yet adding to them an unheard-of abundance of other valuates, of life-goods and strengths, is an educator, whom science with its theories, is certainly not capable of replacing. But, if the belief were untrue, we would have to fight it despite its accomplishments. It is better to travel into hell with the truth than into heaven at the price of lies!

Freud, in his tolerance, praised religion as a safeguard against neurosis (p. 43). Earlier he had argued that since the weakening of religions, the neuroses had increased extraordinarily (Freud, 1910). I wonder whether chivalry didn't let Freud go too far? I also see in the crowds of the devout who are converging a host of hysteric and obsessive neurotics; apart from the fact that all orthodoxies are to be viewed as collective obsessive neuroses, we find among very devout Christians a great number of psychoneurotics. The degree to which piety has a repressive effect depends very much on its nature. But that the fresh air of the true Gospel provides indispensable protection against the danger of neurosis cannot be denied.

Yet the scope of religion is thereby not at all exhaustively stated. Religion can't be divided up into enthusiasm for art, morality, and protection against neurosis. Still so much else belongs here. Religion concerns itself with the question of the meaning and value of life; with the unifying drive of the intellect toward a universal view that encompasses existence and obligation; with the longing for home and peace; with the drive toward a unio mystica with the absolute; with the spiritual bonds of guilt and with freedom's thirst for grace; with the need for a love that is removed from the unbearable insecurity of earthly life; with innumerable other matters that, in their resettled state, distress and choke the soul, yet through religious counterbalancing lift up human life to radiant mountain peaks with views into the distance that make one indescribably happy, strengthen the heart, and, through the imposition of very heavy moral obligations in the spirit of love, enhance the value of existence. The irreligious person cannot enter into these feelings, just as little as the unmusical person is able to be aware of the content of a composition by Brahms. Religion is, to be sure,
not as aristocratic as art and higher science. It is itself a stream in which lambs swim and elephants can drown. Yet the situation is, however, such as described in the New Testament: ‘For faith is not given to everyone’ (2 Thessalonians 3:3). Under belief, however, we understand not only an idea but rather the stirring of the entire inner human being.

How poor science seems to us in contrast to this abundance, of which we are able to indicate but only a very small part because the space for further elaboration is lacking and words, moreover, cannot reproduce the unutterable! I am not at all surprised that many of the most important researchers conceive of their work as religious service and many of the greatest artists and poets humbly lay their laurel wreaths before the altar of God.

CONCLUSION

How should we imagine the future of the illusion that Freud has raised objections to? It is also my view that it must fall and disappear if only an illusion. But Freud, in fact, didn’t want to pose the question of truth at all; he emphasises explicitly that the illusion could be true (p. 31).

Thus, I am of the opinion that realistic thought must advance as far as the nature of reality possibly allows. How this might happen, I have sketched in the brief remarks of my treatise ‘Weltanschauung and Psychoanalysis’ (Pfister, 1920, p. 289ff.). I indicated how a metaphysics might arise from empirical science as a necessary logical complement, but also how—and this is even more important for religion—conclusions about the meaning and will of the world are possible—in fact necessary—as an outgrowth of the moral destiny.

A balanced religion can result only from the harmonious combination of belief and knowledge, from the interpenetration of wishful and realistic thinking, yet whereby the content of the real thinking may not, through wishful thinking, be falsified in its facts or relationships.

But doesn’t the actual substance of religion, in this synthesis, run off into the depths? Freud suspects so (p. 33), but I cannot share his assumption. In my opinion, the substance of Christianity is in no way attacked if we deny miracles in the sense of God’s intervention in the natural course of events; in any event, it is a fact that millions of Christians did this for centuries and yet beheld in their religion their most holy thing. The god of philosophically-trained modern theology, who is free from coarse anthropomorphisms, the world-will which is directed toward the realisation of love in the highest moral sense, is more elevated than the God who takes a stroll in the evening coolness and closes the doors of the ark by himself, also more elevated than the God who uses the earth as a footstool, and the allegorical language of piety is not allowed to contain any regression to inferior wishful thinking. The moral instructions that we no longer simply let be dictated to us from holy documents, but, as autonomous children of God, derive from the essence of the human being and human community, whereby we, certainly subject the ethical knowledge of early times reverently to examination and reserve to ourselves every right of objecting or rejecting—these instructions are not less sacred to us than the ordinances of any religious documents.

The Bible has become not smaller for us, but more splendid, since we no longer suspect it of being a paper pope and infallible oracle, the legal groundwork for witch trials, but—on the strength of evangelical freedom—subjected to the harshest criticism we have long since rejected reward and punishment as dangerous educational measures, even if we also don’t deny the fact that in the moral commitment there also lies a hygienics that gives information about the dangers threatening individual and social health and, thereby, points to a lawfulness that makes decisions about happiness and suffering and is decisive for the shaping of life. The moral world order is for us not a given condition but a standard-setting norm in the sense just mentioned, a design and legitimacy whose tendency we can recognise from observation of the reality of life and can attempt to bring to expression in moral instructions that we formulate precisely as an expression of the highest cosmic evolutionary striving and, as the result of a relation to the will of the creator, recognise it as willed by God and sacred. Thus, morality by no means
rests upon a heteronomous authority, but rather upon the autonomy of the individual and of the society, yet not on their casual pleasure but instead on their mode of being, which, in return, refers to the last conceivable absolute instance.

Can we dispense with this religious deepening? Will the advance of the exact sciences make it superfluous? The contemporary conservative march in the direction of orthodoxies ought not to be decisive for our judgement. But, from the very character of the human being and the narrow limits of the intellect, I must, in opposition to Freud’s prophecy of the future of an illusion, posit the no longer prophetic, but psychologically-based assertion of the illusion of such a future.

It is very gratifying to me that Freud is basically striving toward the same goal as I—he with his brilliant scholar's imagination, I with my modest means. He is led by his god Logos, under whom he understands the intellect, 'presumably' toward the goal of human love and a decrease in suffering (p. 47). I am led by my god Logos, whom I, admittedly dependent on the first chapter of the Gospel according to John, understand as divine wisdom and love, toward the same goals, and at whose side I would like to place the creation of positive inner and outer goods—more forcefully than Freud's statement with its reminder of Schopenhauer. It is not the religious creed that is the true criterion for a Christian; in John 13:35 another is given. 'By this love you have for one another, everyone will know that you are my disciples.' At the risk of being mocked by loose tongues, I dare to assert again that Freud, in the light of these words, with his view of life, and his life's work has pre-eminence over many a certified church-Christian who considers him a heathen, as he does himself.

And thus The Future of an Illusion and 'The Illusion of a Future' unite in the strong belief whose credo is:

'The truth shall make you free!'

**SUMMARY**

Freud's *The Future of an Illusion* was not just an abstract statement of his position on religion, but part of an ongoing exchange of views with Oskar Pfister, a Zurich pastor. Freud was continuing to try to settle differences between himself and Jung. Pfister, while practising as an analyst in 1928, wrote a respectful reply to Freud, and his 'The Illusion of a Future' has never before appeared in English. Pfister was expressing what he saw as the central weaknesses in Freud's attitude toward ethics, art, philosophy, and the practice of psychotherapy.

Translated by Susan Abrams, with a missing portion supplied by Tom Taylor. Paul Roazen has made editorial choices, and put the citations from Freud in accordance with the words and page numbers from the *Standard Edition*.

**TRANSLATIONS OF SUMMARY**

*L'Avenir d'Une Illusion* de Freud n'était pas juste une déclaration abstraite de sa position sur la religion, mais aussi une partie d'un échange de point de vue continu avec Oskar Pfister, un pasteur de Zurich. Freud poursuivait ses efforts visant à régler ses différences entre Jung et lui-même. Pfister, alors qu'il était analyste praticien, écrivit en 1928, une réponse respectueuse à Freud, et 'l'Illusion d'un Avenir' de Pfister n'a pas été précédemment publié en Anglais. Pfister exprimait alors par ce livre ce qu'il voyait comme les faiblesses centrales dans l'attitude de Freud en ce qui concerne l'éthique, l'art, la philosophie, et la pratique de la psychothérapie.


*El Porvenir de una Ilusión* de Freud no es meramente una declaración abstracta de su posición en materia de religión, sino parte de un continuado intercambio de opiniones con Oskar Pfister, un pastor de Zurich. Freud seguía aún intentando limar sus diferencias con Jung, y Pfister, que trabajaba como analista, escribió en 1928 una respetuosa respuesta a Freud titulada 'La Ilusión de un Porvenir', que hasta ahora no se ha publicado en inglés. En este escrito Pfister expresa lo que le parece ser el punto débil central de la actitud de Freud en cuanto a ética, arte, filosofía y práctica de la psicoterapia.
REFERENCES

FALCKENBERG, R. (n.d.). *Geschichte de neuren Philosophie*.


Copyright © Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1993